In
the several post-mortems of the 2020 election, one key question has remained
unanswered: Are Latino voters really
embracing Donald Trump -- the same guy that referred to Latinos as rapists and criminals, separated immigrant
children from their families, accused of sexually assaulting several women, and
referred to soldiers who lost their lives in battle as “suckers and losers”? Because Trump was able to capture a higher percentage
of Latino votes in Florida and South Texas compared to the 2016 election – various
journalists and political pundits signaled an alarm bell suggesting that the
future of the Democratic Party in Texas and Florida was in peril.
It is
curious that these limited Trump victories were portrayed as an existential crisis for the Democratic Party,
especially in light of CNN exit polls showing that U.S. Latinos overwhelmingly supported Biden (66%) over Trump
(32%) [1] -- an outcome, by the way,
that matched Latino support for Hillary Clinton in 2016. The following statements
illustrate the warnings that accompanied Trump’s victory in South Texas:
“That erosion in an area considered a Democratic
stronghold – is a warning sign to the party as it tries to flip the state. It also serves as a stark reminder that the
Latino vote is diverse, especially in a state like Texas. And that Democrats
cannot take it for granted.” [2]
“And Trump, instead of being a complete drag on Cornyn,
turned in eye-popping numbers in heavily Hispanic counties in South Texas.” [3]
“…such Hispanics joined conservative voters in urban and
suburban areas to ‘deliver the message that life, liberty, law and order, Texas
values and our Second Amendment rights are their top priority.” [4]
Especially
interesting were the various attempts to explain the motivations for Trump’s
newly found success among Latino voters in South Texas and Florida. To explore
these motivations, reporters from the New York Times,[5] CNN [6] and Dallas Morning News [7] captured a variety of
subjective impressions, or theories, from interviews with local legislators,
community leaders, academics, and Hispanic voters. Following are seven distinct
“theories” expressed by these stakeholders as justification for supporting
Donald Trump along with factual information that we believe casts some doubt on
these theories.
· The Jobs Theory: Concerns were raised that abolishing ICE would
hit home to many Latinos that worked in homeland security and as Border Patrol
agents, and also threaten jobs in the oil and gas industry. However, a 2019 report
on the South Texas economy issued by the Texas State Comptroller’s Office [8] reported the following
employment picture: (a) the number of jobs in South Texas related to justice,
public order and safety activities were 29,654, representing 2.9 percent of all
jobs in the region, (b) the four military installations in the region provided
41,044 jobs which represented 6.5 percent of all military jobs in Texas, and
(c) 4,794 jobs or 0.57 percent of all jobs in the region were concentrated in
the oil and gas or petroleum and coal products manufacturing industries. Taken
together, these three industries accounted for a relatively small percentage (9%)
of all jobs in the South Texas region. Moreover,
the oil and gas industry in Texas had already lost 51,000 jobs due to steep declines
in demand and prices resulting from the pandemic that occurred under the watch
of the Texas Republican administration.[9] The large presence of military jobs may
suggest a heightened sense of loyalty to the current president; however, did
this sense of loyalty change when Donald Trump publicly disparaged military
leaders, heroes and soldiers?
· The Shared Values Theory: Some Latinos believed
that Republicans shared similar values with Hispanic culture related to family,
life and religious freedom. Trump’s family values are questionable given
the numerous allegations of sexual assaults on women. And while Hispanics may
value pro-life or anti-abortion policies, it is noteworthy that,
according to a CDC 2016 report on statewide abortions,[10] Hispanic women nevertheless
reported 20,667 abortions or 38.7 percent of all abortions in Texas. Regarding religious
freedom, some Hispanics felt that Trump “brings God to our country” and
values religious freedom. Yet Trump has
publicly voiced his intolerance for people of different religions, such as
Muslims.
· Communications Theory: Trump was described
as a plain speaker. Indeed, Trump has managed to use plainly worded insults and
profanity towards women, Latinos, Blacks, the disabled, athletes and war
heroes. Trump also uses plain language when addressing public policy issues
because his knowledge is very limited.
· The Macho Theory: To some Hispanics,
especially males, Trump’s macho style was appealing. Machos tend to be
authoritarian and domineering, lack emotional investment, and believe that
women should be subservient to males.
Considerable research, however, regarding Hispanic family dynamics
confirms that Hispanic women are the primary decision-makers in the typical
Hispanic household. [11]
· The Exploited Theory: Several Hispanics
believed that Democrats took them for granted while Republicans gave them a
voice. This theory has merit since the
Democratic campaign in Texas was missing in action until the final week of the
2020 election, while Republicans launched aggressive campaigns in Florida and
South Texas to capture the Latino vote. Nonetheless,
the South Texas region remains one of the poorest regions in Texas and has
progressed little economically under the Republican leadership over the past
decade.
· Law and Order Theory: Trump was believed
to support the police, law and order, and against defunding the police. But
Trump publicly praises white supremacists and encourages supporters to use
violence against Biden supporters and current government officials such as
Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer. During the
Trump administration, the number of hate crimes reported by the FBI have
increased as well [12] [13]
· Socialist Theory: In Florida, Republicans utilized social
media, outdoor parties and churches to promote the false message that Joe Biden
was sympathetic to socialist dictators like Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro –
which Cubans and Venezuelans strongly disliked. Despite being false, however,
the strategy was successful in creating stronger support for Trump in Florida.
While these theories are interesting, one should keep in mind that they are merely subjective impressions of Trump’s appeal that should not be generalized to Hispanics in South Texas, Florida or other communities. Nonetheless, two disturbing attributes seem to emerge after reviewing these “theories:” a departure from reality and a distinct level of gullibility. That is, Latino Trumpers reveal a tendency to reject the facts related to an issue and seem easily deceived by the myths and distortions of the truth promoted by the Republican Party – attributes that are common among general Trump supporters. The gullibility attribute in Latinos stems from a general tendency to be more trusting of others than non-Latinos, although trust in government has clearly declined in recent years. Immigrants with limited English-speaking skills are more likely to trust Spanish-language media that they are better able to understand. Like the elderly, less acculturated Hispanics are less likely to be suspicious of the many scams and telemarketers that contact households on a daily basis and are often victimized according to annual fraud reports by the Federal Trade Commission. During 2011, 13.4 percent of Hispanics were victims – almost 50 percent higher than the rate for non-Hispanic whites. [14] Sadly, Spanish-language media is frequently used as the vehicle to victimize Hispanics, a practice that was successfully utilized by Republicans in Florida. Republican campaign strategists probably discovered these attributes early in the 2020 campaign and utilized it to their advantage in Florida, Texas and perhaps other communities. The ability to identify communities of Latinos that fit the Latino Trumper profile is a clear advantage for the Republic Party, especially in communities that the Democratic Party chooses to ignore.
Despite
these two victories, there is reason to believe that Biden did not lose Texas
due to weak Latino support from the South Texas region. To understand this point, let’s first review
some basic information about the voting population in South Texas.
Profile of South Texas
To
understand the voting outcomes in South Texas during the 2020 election, it is
helpful to first understand some of the demographic and economic
characteristics that distinguish this region from the state’s population. We
will summarize some of the information provided in a summary report of the
South Texas region by the Texas State Comptroller’s Office.[15] The South Texas region includes 28 counties
as shown by the yellow highlighted area in the following map (see Figure 1 below):
The
2019 estimated population for South Texas was 2.4 million, representing 8.4
percent of the total population in Texas.
Between 2010 and 2019, the region has grown more slowly (7.4% rate) than
the state’s growth rate (15.3%). The region’s population is predominately
Hispanic (83%), one of the poorest in the state with a per capita income of
$31,965 compared to $50,355 for Texas, and has an unemployment rate nearly
twice as high (5.3%) as Texas (3.5%). The
percentage of persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher in 2018 was decidedly
lower in South Texas 17.8%) than the state (29.3%).
Table
1 below shows the number of registered voters in Texas compared to South Texas. The number of registered voters in South
Texas represented less than 1 percent (0.6%) of the total number of registered
voters in Texas. Due to its small number of registered voters, the South Texas
region does not appear particularly influential in the 2020 presidential
election.
Table 1: Registered Voters by Regions, 2020
|
Geographic Area |
Number |
Percent |
|
Texas |
16,955,519 |
100.0 |
|
South Texas |
103,833 |
0.6 |
|
Other Regions |
16,851,686 |
99.4 |
Table
2 below shows that 11,071,502 million Texans voted during the 2020 election – a
voter turnout of 65.3 percent. Of these total voters, 52.9 percent supported Donald
Trump while 47.1 percent supported Joe Biden.
Compared to the state, support for Trump was slightly higher (54.4%) in South
Texas..
Table
2: Texas Votes Cast for Presidential
Candidates, by State
and South Texas
Region, 2020
|
Geographic Area |
Total |
Trump |
Biden |
|
Texas |
11,071,502 |
5,860,096 |
5,211,406 |
|
Percent |
100.0 |
52.9 |
47.1 |
|
South Texas |
53,807 |
29,1 70 |
24,537 |
|
Percent |
100.0 |
54.4 |
45.6 |
|
Source:
https://results.texas-election.com/county |
|||
Although
it will be some time before we know the final votes cast in the 2020 election
by race-ethnicity, a preliminary picture of the voting outcomes in Texas,
Florida and Arizona were provided by CNN exit polls on election day. [16] An election exit poll is
a poll of randomly selected voters that is taken immediately after they have
exited a polling station. Exit polls can be affected by non-response bias, language
bias, and clustering sampling methods that have been criticized for excluding Spanish-speaking
voters who often vote for Democratic candidates.[17] Table 3 below summarizes the results for
Texas that included 4,768 voters. Statewide
Latino support for Joe Biden was higher (58%) than South Texas (45.6%) while
statewide Latino support was lower for Donald Trump (41%) than South Texas
(54.4%). Table 4 shows that in Florida the margins for Latino support were
closer but still higher for Joe Biden (52%) than Donald Trump (47%). Table 5 shows that in Arizona, Latinos strongly supported Joe
Biden (63%) over Donald Trump (36%).
Table 3: Exit Poll Outcomes for Texas Presidential
Candidates, 2020
(Percent)
|
Candidate |
Race-Ethnicity of Voter |
|||
|
White |
Black |
Latino |
Asian |
|
|
Donald Trump |
66 |
9 |
41 |
30 |
|
Joe Biden |
33 |
90 |
58 |
63 |
|
Source: CNN Exit Polls, n = 4,768 |
||||
Table 4: Exit Poll Outcomes
for Florida Presidential Candidates, 2020
|
Candidate |
Race-Ethnicity of Voter |
|||
|
White |
Black |
Latino |
Asian |
|
|
Donald Trump |
61 |
9 |
47 |
n/a |
|
Joe Biden |
38 |
89 |
52 |
n/a |
|
Source: CNN Exit Polls, n = 5,906 ( n/a = sample to
small to project) |
||||
Table 5: Exit Poll Outcomes
for Arizona Presidential Candidates, 2020
|
Candidate |
Race-Ethnicity of Voter |
|||
|
White |
Black |
Latino |
Asian |
|
|
Donald Trump |
51 |
n/a |
36 |
n/a |
|
Joe Biden |
47 |
n/a |
63 |
n/a |
|
Source: CNN Exit Polls, n = 1,639 (n/a = sample too
small to project) |
||||
To
obtain a more detailed picture of candidate support at the county level for
South Texas, Table 6 below presents the eight “heavily Hispanic” counties in
South Texas that were included in the recent analysis by the Dallas Morning
News [18] and used as the basis for
sounding the alarm bell to Texas Democrats. Frio County was included in their
analysis although it is part of West Texas.
The table reveals that support for Donald Trump ranged from 50 to 66
percent; the region produced a total of 8,975 college graduates who were 25
years or older; and there were high concentrations of Hispanics that ranged
from 73 to 94 percent (median of 83%). The region showed only 103,833
registered voters.
Table 6: Heavily South
Texas Hispanic Counties Carried by Trump
|
County |
Total Registered Voters |
No. Hispanic College
Graduates 25yrs & Over |
Percent Voted for Trump |
Percent Voted for Biden |
Pct. Hispanic Pop. 2018 |
|
Frio (West Tx) |
8,984 |
500 |
53.7 |
46.3 |
78.8 |
|
Jim Wells |
26,636 |
1,784 |
54.8 |
45.2 |
80.3 |
|
Kenedy |
296 |
12 |
66.1 |
33.9 |
87.7 |
|
Kleberg |
18,749 |
2,254 |
50.9 |
49.1 |
72.7 |
|
LaSalle |
4,426 |
345 |
55.9 |
44.1 |
82.4 |
|
Reeves |
7,558 |
431 |
61.7 |
38.3 |
75.1 |
|
Val Verde |
28,927 |
3,021 |
55.0 |
45.0 |
81.8 |
|
Zapata |
8,257 |
628 |
52.8 |
47.2 |
94.2 |
|
Total 8 Counties |
103,833 |
8,975 |
54.4 |
45.6 |
83.0 |
Source: https://results.texas-election.com/county / ACS 2018 5-Year Estimates.
Previous
polling of U.S. Latinos by the Pew Research Center revealed that Joe Biden’s
support was distinctly higher for college graduates (69%) than non-college
graduates (61%).[19] The percentage of college graduates in the
South Texas region was 17.8 percent, which was distinctly lower than the State
of Texas (29.3%) and the U.S. (31.5%). [20] The South Texas region
produces its share of college graduates, but many move away due to a poor
economy, leaving only 8,975 graduates who resided in the region in 2018. The
political potential of South Texas is limited by the small number of registered
voters and college graduates.
In
our opinion, the high percentage of Hispanics in the South Texas region (83.0%)
is perhaps the key factor that attracts the attention of political candidates,
journalists and pundits who tend to portray South Texas as the bell weather
region for Texas Latino politics.
However, the focus on percentages can be misleading as an indicator of
political influence when the population base and number of registered voters is
small in comparison to other regions in Texas.
Considerably greater political benefit was realized by the Biden campaign in larger urban areas in Texas with higher numbers of Hispanic registered voters and college graduates. Table 7 below page presents a similar profile for the top five Texas counties ranked by the total number of registered voters. It is readily apparent that these five counties included a much larger number of registered voters (7.1 million) and more Hispanic college graduates (449,751) despite having a more moderate concentration of the Hispanic population ranging from 29 to 60 percent (median = 41%). More importantly, support for Joe Biden was distinctly higher than the South Texas region, ranging from 50 to 73 percent. Interestingly, Travis County had one of the lowest percentages of the Hispanic population (33.9%), yet also revealed the highest level of support for Joe Biden (73.0%) – an affirmation of the political power leveraged by the college-educated community surrounding The University of Texas at Austin. Thus, a moderate concentration of Hispanics coupled with a substantial college-educated community appears to have substantially contributed to Joe Biden’s standing in Texas.
Table 7: Voter Profile of Top 5 Texas Counties Ranked by
Number of Registered Voters
|
Top 5 Counties |
Total
Registered Voters |
No. Hispanic College Graduates 25yrs
& Over |
Pct. of All Votes for Trump |
Pct. of All Votes for Biden |
Pct. Hispanic Pop. 2018 |
|
Harris |
2,480,522 |
140,157 |
43.4 |
56.6 |
42.6 |
|
Dallas |
1,398,469 |
54,553 |
33.9 |
66.1 |
39.9 |
|
Tarrant |
1,212,524 |
68,466 |
50.0 |
50.0 |
28.5 |
|
Bexar |
1,189,373 |
118,109 |
40.8 |
59.2 |
60.0 |
|
Travis |
854,577 |
68,466 |
27.0 |
73.0 |
33.9 |
|
Total 5 Counties |
7,135,465 |
449,751 |
40.2 |
59.8 |
41.0 |
The
political muscle of communities with colleges and universities has been documented
by other analysts as well. In past presidential elections, counties with
flagship higher education institutions have increasingly swung toward
Democrats. According to a recent
analysis of 2020 election results by The Chronicle of Higher Education, Trump
carried 87 of the 136 counties in five states that flipped from Trump in 2016
to Biden in 2020 (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) that
included four-year public or private nonprofit colleges with at least 100
students. Biden carried only 49 of these
counties according to unofficial results. How did Biden manage to flip these
five states? As explained by the
reporter analyzing this outcome:
“But Biden’s counties
were more populous: They produced 12.7
million total votes, more than double the 5.4 million votes that came from the
counties with colleges in them that Trump won.
Biden’s counties, while smaller in number, also had more colleges in
them: 191 to 138 in Trump’s
counties.” (page 2) [21]
Thus, Trump’s advantage of capturing more
counties was overcome by Biden’s advantage of capturing fewer counties with
substantially more voters.
Did Weak Support in South Texas Cause Joe
Biden to Lose Texas?
Some
of the news stories suggested that Joe Biden had lost the Texas vote to Trump due
to weak Latino support in South Texas compared to the support previously
enjoyed by Hillary Clinton in 2016. To
address this issue, we conducted three hypothetical analyses to evaluate how the
statewide voting outcomes for Donald Trump and Joe Biden would change under the
following three scenarios:
· Scenario 1: All of the votes
cast by South Texas were removed from the total votes cast in Texas
· Scenario 2: All of the South
Texas votes were cast in favor of Donald Trump
· Scenario 3: All of the South
Texas votes were cast in favor of Joe Biden
Table 8 below presents the
calculations used to evaluate these three scenarios.
Table 8: Hypothetical Voting Scenarios for Presidential
Vote in Texas
|
Scenario |
Trump |
Biden |
Total |
|
Total Texas Votes Cast |
5,860,096 |
5,211,406 |
11,071,502 |
|
Percent |
52.9 |
47.1 |
100.0 |
|
South Texas Votes Cast |
29,270 |
24,537 |
53,807 |
|
Percent |
54.4 |
45.6 |
100.0 |
|
Scenario 1: Removing South Texas Votes |
5,830,826 |
5,186,869 |
11,017,695 |
|
Adjusted Percent |
52.9 |
47.1 |
100.0 |
|
Scenario 2: Adding All South Texas Votes to Trump |
5,884,633 |
5,186,869 |
11,071,502 |
|
Adjusted Percent |
53.2 |
46.8 |
100.0 |
|
Scenario 3: Adding All South Texas Votes to Biden |
5,870,826 |
5,240,676 |
11,071,502 |
|
Adjusted Percent |
52.7 |
47.3 |
100.0 |
|
Source: Results.texas-election.com/county; Rincon &
Associates Analysis, 2020 |
|||
Using the percentages for each scenario in Table 8, Figure 2 below clearly illustrates that under each scenario, Donald Trump
still wins the Texas vote. Thus, the
votes from South Texas – regardless of whether they were totally removed or
changed to votes for Trump or Biden – would not have changed the final Texas
vote outcome for the presidential candidates.
How much confidence can we place on Hispanic
polling results?
As
final food for thought, it is helpful to weigh in the insights from The New
York Times polling expert – Nate Cohn – who recently shared his post-mortem of
the 2020 election in an op-ed entitled “What went wrong with polling? Some early theories.” Of particular relevance are his conclusions
about the extent to which 2020 polling errors were influenced by Hispanic
voters. The following comments are paraphrased from his narrative:
“What appeared in
Miami-Dade was not just about Cuban-Americans.
Although Democrats flipped a Senate seat and are leading the
presidential race in Arizona, Mr. Trump made huge gains in many Hispanic
communities across the country…Many national surveys don’t release results for
Hispanic voters because any given survey usually has only a small sample of
this group....But if the Florida polls are any indication, it’s at least
possible that national surveys missed Mr. Trump’s strength among Hispanic
voters. It seems entirely possible that
the polls could have missed by 10 points among the group. If true, it would
account for a modest but significant part – maybe one-fourth – of the national
polling error.” (p. 6) [22]
Mr. Cohn’s assessment may have merit regarding
pollsters who only occasionally conduct polls of U.S. Hispanics and thus more
likely to include common sources of bias in studies of this population segment.
However, the results of polls of U.S. Hispanics conducted by more experienced
pollsters of Hispanics – such as Latino Decisions and Pew Research Center ---
often include larger samples and were more closely aligned with the results of
exit polls conducted by CNN --- resulting perhaps in less polling error. In our recent publication, “The Culture of
Research,” [23] we discuss the following common sources of
bias that are observed in surveys of multicultural populations:
· Identity Bias: The use of vague, outdated or offensive
race-ethnic labels that lead to over-counts or under-counts of respondents, or
just missing data.
· Coverage Bias: The use of sampling
frames that exclude Hispanics, immigrants, the lower income and non-English
speakers.
· Sampling Bias: Selecting samples of respondents that do not
represent the population of interest, often by using non-random samples, small
samples or sampling high density areas populated by Blacks, Hispanics or
Asians.
· Mode Bias: Providing survey
respondents only one mode (i.e., telephone, online or mail) to complete a survey
which can exclude persons with vision, hearing or speaking impairments, lower
literacy skills, or no Internet access.
· Language Bias: Providing English-only
surveys or poorly translated surveys to Hispanic and Asian immigrants lowers
response rates and response quality since immigrants prefer native language
surveys that are accurately translated.
· Weighting Bias: Distorted
statistical indicators can result from the failure to apply weights to correct
survey sample imbalances or using weights that are outdated.
We agree with Mr. Cohen that greater polling
error can occur in studies that include Hispanic populations, although we would
add that such errors are more likely to occur in polls conducted by companies
that do not have a strong track record for conducting studies of U.S.
Hispanics.
Conclusion
Although the final 2020 election results with
detailed demographic information will not be available for several months,
there are some general conclusions that we can make given the information reviewed
thus far:
· Joe Biden did not lose
Texas due to weak support from South Texas Latinos but rather the limited
political resources in the region.
· Latino voters were
highly engaged to vote in the 2020 election as determined by pre-election polls.[24]
· Despite the threat of
COVID-19 and numerous voter suppression tactics by the Republican Party,
Latinos turned out to vote in historic numbers.
· Latinos were
responsive to the message strategies of both campaigns, whether the message was
accurate or fabricated. Latino Trumpers in Florida and Texas appeared more trusting and easier to mislead
with false information.
· Latinos revealed
stronger support for Joe Biden than Donald Trump in Texas, Florida and Arizona,
although stronger than expected Latino support was observed for Donald Trump.
· Joe Biden revealed
stronger support among Hispanic women, the college-educated, and those living
in large urban areas. Donald Trump
showed stronger support from Hispanic males who were not college educated and
lived in smaller urban and rural communities.
· There is reason to
believe that national pollsters experienced more errors when measuring the
sentiments of Hispanic voters, although more confidence was proposed for pollsters with a stronger track record in polling the Hispanic
population and using higher standards.
End Notes
[1] CNN Exit Polls (2020, November 11). Accessed at: https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/national-results/0
[2] Solis, D., Corchado, A., Morris, A., and Cobler, P. (2020,
November 6). With the Latino vote up for grabs, how did Trump make inroads in
South Texas? The Dallas Morning
News. Accessed at: https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2020/11/06/latino-vote-up-for-grabs-as-trump-makes-inroads-in-south-texas/
[3] Garrett, R.T. and Hacker, H.K. (2020, November 4).
Dark alley no more: This time, Texas
Republicans were ready for the Democrats. Dallas Morning News. Accessed at https://www.dallasnews.com/news/elections/2020/11/04/dark-alley-no-more-this-time-texas-republicans-were-ready-for-the-democrats/
[4] Ibid.
[5] Medina, J. (2020, October 19). The macho appeal of Donald
Trump. New York Times. Accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/14/us/politics/trump-macho-appeal.html
[6] Chavez, N. (2020, November 9). ‘There's no such thing as the Latino vote.'
2020 results reveal a complex electorate.
CNN, Accessed at: https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/09/politics/latino-voters-florida-texas-arizona/index.html
[7] Ibid, 2. Solis,
D., Corchado, A., Morris, A., and Cobler, P. (2020, November 6). With the
Latino vote up for grabs, how did Trump make inroads in South Texas?
[8] Comptroller.Texas.Gov. (2020, November 6). The South Texas Region 2020 Regional Report. Texas
State Comptroller, Accessed at: https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/economic-data/regions/south.php
[9] Peacock, B.
(2020, May 11). Renewable energy booming
in Texas as oil and gas struggles. The Texan. Accessed at: https://thetexan.news/renewable-energy-booming-in-texas-as-oil-and-gas-struggles/#:~:text=EnergyIssuesRenewable%20Energy%20Booming%20in%20Texas%20as%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Struggles&text=Solar%20energy%20also%20reached%20its,is%20down%20over%2010%20percent.
[10] Jatlaoui, T.C.
Eckhaus, L., and Mandel, M.G. (2019,
November 29). Abortion Surveillance – United States 2016. MMWR Surveill Summ
2018; 68 (No. SS-11: 1-41. Accessed at: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/ss/ss6811a1.htm
[11] Korzenny and Korzenny, ( ).
Hispanic marketing.
[12] Hancı, F.
(2019, July 22). Hate crimes increase in
the US since Trump’s election. Politics Today, Accessed at https://politicstoday.org/hate-crimes-increase-in-the-us-since-trumps-election/
[13] Brooks, B. (2019, November 12). Victims of anti-Latino hate crimes soar in
U.S.: FBI report. Reuters. Accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hatecrimes-report/victims-of-anti-latino-hate-crimes-soar-in-u-s-fbi-report-idUSKBN1XM2OQ
[14] Anderson, K.B.
(2013, April). Consumer Fraud in the United States, 2011 The Third FTC Survey,
Federal Trade Commission, Accessed at: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/consumer-fraud-united-states-2011-third-ftc-survey/130419fraudsurvey_0.pdf
[15] Ibid 8, The South Texas Region 2020 Regional Report.
[16] Ibid 1, CNN Exit polls in Texas.
[17] Barreto, M. (2016, November 10). Lies, damn lies and
exit polls. Latino Decisions. Retrieved from http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2016/11/10/lies-damn-lies-and-exit-polls/
[18] Ibid 3, Dark alley no more: This time, Texas Republicans were ready for
the Democrats.
[19] Krogstad, J.M. and Lopez, M.H. (2020, October 16). Latino voters have growing confidence on Biden
key issues, while confidence in Trump remains low. Pew Research Center,
Accessed at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/16/latino-voters-have-growing-confidence-in-biden-on-key-issues-while-confidence-in-trump-remains-low/
[20] Ibid 8, The South Texas Region 2020 Regional Report.
[21] June, A.W. (2020, November 15). How higher ed helped flip 5 states in the
2020 election. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Accessed at https://www.chronicle.com/article/how-higher-ed-helped-flip-5-states-in-the-2020-election
[22] Cohn, N.
(2020, November 10). What went
wrong with polling? Some early
theories. The New York Times - Upshot.
Accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/upshot/polls-what-went-wrong.html
[23] Rincon, E.T.
(2020, August 20). The Culture
of Research. The Writer’s Marq,
Dallas, Texas.
[24] Pantoja,
A. (2020, November 2). Latino voters are
ready to deliver a decisive victory to Biden and the Democrats. Latino
Decisions. Accessed at: https://latinodecisions.com/blog/latino-voters-are-ready-to-deliver-a-decisive-victory-to-biden-and-the-democrats/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20From%20Latino%20Decisions%20-%20title%202020-11-03%20103850&utm_content=New%20From%20Latino%20Decisions%20-%20title%202020-11-03%20103850+CID_48c4eeda4a81e8820521b83dcf471e94&utm_source=Email%20marketing%20software&utm_term=Latino%20Voters%20Are%20Ready%20to%20Deliver%20a%20Decisive%20Victory%20to%20Biden%20and%20the%20Democrats%20Adrian%20Pantoja%20%20November%202%202020
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